The Dawkins Delusion

Review by Prof Alister E. McGrath

Richard Dawkins’ latest book The God Delusion fires off a series of salvoes against religion. It is perhaps his weakest book to date, marred by its excessive reliance on bold assertion and rhetorical flourish, where the issues so clearly demand careful reflection and painstaking analysis, based on the best evidence available. Attractive precisely because it is simplistic, Dawkins demands the eradication of religion. Only when it is eliminated can the human race rest secure! Get rid of religion, and the world will be a better place. It is a familiar theme, if stated with greater fervour than before.

But is it right? What happens if a society rejects the idea of God? The evidence suggests that it transcendentalizes alternatives – such as the ideals of liberty or equality. These now become quasi-divine authorities, which none are permitted to challenge. Perhaps the most familiar example of this dates from the French Revolution, at a time when traditional notions of God were discarded as obsolete, and replaced by transcendentalized human values. Madame Rolande was brought to the guillotine to face execution on trumped-up charges in 1792. As she prepared to die, she bowed mockingly towards the statue of liberty in the Place de la Révolution, and uttered the words for which she is remembered: “liberty, what crimes are committed in your name.” All ideals – divine, transcendent, human, or invented – are capable of being abused. That’s just the way human nature is. And knowing this, we need to work out what to do about it, rather than lashing out uncritically at religion.

Suppose Dawkins were to have his way, and that religion were to be eradicated. Would that end the divisions within humanity? Certainly not. Such divisions are ultimately social constructs, which reflect the fundamental sociological need for communities to self-define, and identify those who are “in” and those who are “out”; those who are “friends”, and those who are “foes”. The importance of “binary opposition” in shaping perceptions of identity has been highlighted in recent years, not least on account of the major debate between different schools of critical thought over whether such “oppositions” determine and shape human thought, or are the outcome of human thought. A series of significant “binary oppositions” are held to have shaped western thought – such as “male-female” and “white-black”. This binary opposition leads to the construction of the category of “the other” – the devalued half of a binary opposition, when applied to groups of people. Group identity is often fostered by defining “the other” – as, for example, in Nazi Germany, with its opposition “Aryan-Jew”. At times, this binary opposition is defined in religious terms – as in “Catholic-Protestant”, or “believer-infidel”.


Let’s look at one of these, which I experienced at first hand when growing up in during the 1960s. Primarily for sociological reasons, the binary opposition “Catholic-Protestant” came to be perceived as normative. Each side saw its opponent as “the other”, a perception that was relentlessly reinforced by novelists and other shapers of public opinion. Media reporting of the social unrest in from 1970 to about 1995 reinforced the plausibility of this judgement. Yet this is a historically conditioned oppositionalism, shaped and determined by complex social forces. It is not a specifically religious phenomenon. Religion was merely the social demarcator that dominated in this situation. In others, the demarcators would have to do with ethnic or cultural origins, language, gender, age, social class, sexual orientation, wealth, tribal allegiance, ethical values, or political views.

Dawkins’ simplistic assertion that the elimination of religion would lead to the ending of violence, social tension, or discrimination is thus sociologically naïve. It fails to take account of the way in which human beings create values and norms, and make sense of their identity and their surroundings. If religion were to cease to exist, other social demarcators would emerge as decisive, becoming transcendentalized as necessary in response to the situation. Dawkins has no interest in sociology, as might be expected. Yet the study of how individuals and societies function casts serious doubt on one of the most fundamental assertions of Dawkins’ analysis.

The question of the future role of religion in is far too important to leave to the fanatics, or to atheist fundamentalists. There is a real need to deal with the ultimate causes of social division and exclusion. Religion’s in there, along with a myriad of other factors. Yet, it can cause problems. But it also has the capacity to transform, creating a deep sense of personal identity and value, and bringing social cohesion. Let’s skip the rhetoric, and cut to the reality. It’s much less simple – but it might actually help us address the real social issue that we face in modern Britian.


Alister E. McGrath is Professor of Historical Theology at Oxford University. A former atheist himself, he has written extensively on atheism, particularly the ideas of Richard Dawkins, and their foundations in modern science. His book "The Dawkins Delusion" will be published by SPCK in February 2007.