From the Anglican Communion Institute via TitusOneNine:
Written by: Rev. Dr. Philip Turner
Sunday, February 7th, 2010
I
I owe it to my readers to provide an explanation of a puzzling title. What does a discussion of “communion, order, and dissent” have to do with the well-known and well-loved children’s story of Puss and Boots? Remember, in the story, the hero can only reach his goal if he listens to a despised cat that he must take as his companion on the way. It would seem that the point of the story is that attention must be given to what we might otherwise despise if we are to succeed in our more “high flown” endeavors.
My point is that hierarchy, the subject of this conference, is an aspect of church order, and both have become something like the cat in Puss and Boots. We cannot reach our more noble goals without these unwelcome sources of help. Nevertheless, for some years we have neglected these despised companions, and as a result our church and our communion are in a terrible mess. Indeed, our seminaries do little or nothing to introduce future clergy to the importance of church polity. I remember when I was in seminary the arguments about church order that so engaged the Reformers were mentioned, but only in passing. Polity, we were told, is a subject we ought to “bone up on” because there would be polity questions on our General Ordination Exams. The message was clear. Hierarchy and order are not very important subjects. Yet, here we are at the beginning of the 21st Century faced with fiercely debated polity issues. The debate centers on the communion wide challenge of an Anglican Covenant and on a domestic legal battle over the meaning of the constitution and canons of The Episcopal Church (TEC). The former challenge might produce a divided communion and/or result in TEC becoming a second track form of Anglicanism. The latter might produce a change in our constitution effected by a secular court rather than constitutionally mandated procedures.
It is high time we look once more at these despised companions and give them the attention they deserve. The simple fact is that neither the Anglican Communion nor TEC can remain catholic expressions of Christian belief and practice unless church order is accorded the significance that rightfully belongs to it. I can provide a simple example. Can you imagine Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, John Locke or John Rawls writing a political philosophy that said nothing about the form of governance best suited to reach the social, economic and political goals they believe life in society should support? Yet we are daily provided with accounts of the life and mission of the church that are utterly silent on the matter of church governance.
II
My purpose in this essay is to play the role of the wretched cat “Polity” and ask afresh why we have a form of church governance in the first place, what form is best for it to take, and what to do when conscience prevents us from living according to the dictates of those in authority over us. I think a simple statement is the best way to begin. The form of governance adopted by a church (or for that matter any society) is not the result of social cause followed by social effect. Neither is it merely a practical and morally indifferent arrangement for ordering every day life. When we enter a form of polity we enter the realm of freedom rather than necessity. We enter a realm of human goals and aspirations rather than one of mere efficiencies. To put the matter more directly, when we look at a form of governance, be it of a church or a commonwealth, we look at a means of pursuing certain human ends rather than others.
For John Locke, the end of government was the protection of life, liberty, and property. For Thomas Jefferson the end of government was the guarantee of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. There is a big difference between the protection of property and the pursuit of happiness, and this difference produces concomitant differences in the form of governance thought apposite for the pursuit of these varying ends.
Now, if we take this point and ask how it applies to the Anglican Communion and to The Episcopal Church we will be forced to say that church polity is not an indifferent matter. Church polity is part of an adequate account of the doctrine of the church. Church polity is tied directly to theology. It is requisite for a church, therefore, to ask if its form of governance in fact accords with and supports its nature as a divinely founded society whose ends and way of life are properly divinely ordered.
I do not mean to suggest by this statement that there is but one form of governance that accords with the divine foundation or ordering of the church. I am neither a Mennonite, a Presbyterian nor a Roman Catholic. I do mean to say, however, that church order is a theological matter. It is more than a practical arrangement. It is not one that, from a theological perspective, is utterly indifferent. By implication, I am led to say that, within the United States, because of the constitutionally mandated separation between church and state, issues concerning the meaning and adequacy of the constitution of a church do not rightly fall under the jurisdiction of a secular court. The meaning and adequacy of ecclesial order, to the extent that order differs from any other, are in part theological questions that concern the goals and form of life thought proper for a society whose foundation and form of life rest in a particular understanding of divine nature and providence. Indeed, the complexities of church order and hierarchy are so closely tied to differences in theology that one cannot speak of one without comment on the other.
I will leave it to the lawyers among us to sort out the adequacy of my interpretation of no establishment and free exercise. Indeed, I hope they will. My goal at the moment, however, is to show how, in the case of the Anglican Communion and The Episcopal Church, theology and polity are connected and how different understandings of the connection map the terrain of our present conflicts. These are differences the church(s) must sort out for itself (themselves). They are matters of fidelity and obedience to the faith rather than questions for secular courts to adjudicate as aspects of property law.
III
The best place to begin this exercise is with the proposed Anglican Covenant and the various reactions to it. By its own admission, the proposed covenant is designed to protect and further “communion”. In its “Introduction” the framers of the proposed covenant deploy the theological notion of communion as a means of summarizing the full content of Christian belief and practice. They intend that it provide the raison d’être for the specific provisions of The Anglican Communion Covenant (TACC), and so insist that, though not a part of TACC per se, it is always to be printed along with the actual text.
The theological question is how communion is to be understood and maintained. There are two answers to this question now before the Communion, and they lead to very different preferences for the sort of order and hierarchy that ought to bind the various churches of the communion together. I will call one understanding of communion, “thick” and the other “thin.”
The “thick” view presents communion as a complex relationship involving not only cooperation and mutual assistance in carrying out a common mission but also rather extensive agreements about both belief and practice. In support of these agreements, the thick understanding contains within it certain forms of hierarchical relationship and certain procedures. These hierarchies and procedures are designed both to maintain and further common belief and practice and to provide means to address circumstances in which the actions of one or more churches within the Communion are no longer “recognizable” to the others as ones that accord with the shared understandings that bind the churches of the Communion together. This thick view of communion has found expression in The Virginia Report, The Windsor Report and in the various versions of the proposed covenant that have appeared.
The “thin” view emphasizes mission, mutual hospitality (which includes Eucharistic sharing) and aid rather than common belief and practice. The issue for those who hold the thin view is not “recognizability”, but concrete, practical forms of interchange that render mutual aid and assistance in carrying out the mission of the church. That mission is shaped by the particular context in which the various churches of the Communion may find themselves. Further, Christian belief and practice must find various expressions, each of which speaks meaningfully to a particular context. The advocates of the thin position have a polycentric view of belief, practice, order, and to some extent mission. In their view, the issue is not so much “recognizability” as it is “difference” that contributes to the richness of Christian expression and the effectiveness of mission. As a result, advocates of the thin position (as within TEC) may well promote strong forms of local hierarchy but they oppose any form of hierarchy above that of the local church. In their view, each local church should be free to order its affairs in relation to its own context rather than in relation to “recognizable” forms of doctrine, worship and moral practice. This view has not found support in the various renditions of the proposed covenant but it has been variously expressed and stoutly defended on progressive blogs and in a range of articles and addresses.
IV
TACC proposes that the churches of the Anglican Communion bind themselves by a thick version of communion. The issue is how are communion and order related in the proposal now before the churches? The question presents a challenge for supporters of a thick view of communion because Anglican polity has, for theological as well as practical reasons, eschewed any form of centralized jurisdiction that might enforce the sort of thick view of communion they support. The reasons for this eschewal are fourfold. First, from earliest times English speaking Christians have sought a national expression of Christian belief and practice and have given theological reasons for this focus. Second, the original break with Rome involved a rejection of what were understood as theological novelties—novelties that were linked to the Papal office. In fact, the Reformers regarded the Pope as the instrument of Satan. Similar theological objections to the centralized authority of the Papacy were expressed at the first Lambeth Conference because of the recently announced Marian dogmas and the previous claims to infallibility. Third, Anglicans tend to place great emphasis on the Doctrine of the Incarnation, and they interpret it in a way that stresses effective adaptation of the message and ministry of the church to local contexts. Fourth, the established position of the Church of England renders a synod superior to that of the C of E a constitutional impossibility.
The question confronting supporters of the thick view of communion is this. How are the churches of the Communion to maintain mutually recognizable forms of belief and practice and yet respect the autonomy of each? The success of TACC depends upon finding an adequate answer to this question. It is my belief that TACC has set the Communion off in a direction that will yield a satisfactory answer, and in doing so its drafters have at long last given polity the attention it deserves.
How so? It is quite a simple matter to establish the fact that its account of communion is thick and that the purpose of the Covenant is to protect, strengthen and further this thickly defined marker of Anglican identity. The “Introduction”, which provides the theological foundation for all that follows, insists that all the churches are called, through Christ, into communion with the Triune God. Through this communion, Christians share in the very life of God that is itself a communion between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The mission of the Anglican Communion is to share with all the churches in calling the peoples of the earth, through Christ, into the life of God, and in doing so to manifest life in communion in the relations of its various provinces one with another.
These relations are thickly described. They give concrete expression first of all to “the catholic and apostolic faith uniquely revealed in Holy Scripture and set forth in the catholic creeds” and to which “the historic formularies of the Church of England bear authentic witness.” Advocates of the thick position regard these as necessary points of reference when seeking to determine whether or not a given interpretation of Christian belief and practice is “recognizable” as an adequate expression of the faith members of the Communion hold in common. Though the thick view of communion is not confessional, in contradistinction to the thin version of communion, its advocates regard commonly recognized beliefs and practices to be at the heart of life in communion and so also of the proposed covenant.
So also do certain modes of relationship. These are given summary expression in the “Introduction” as “Faithfulness, honesty, gentleness, humility, patience forgiveness and love itself, lived out in mutual deference and service among the Church’s people and through its ministries…” We might say by way of summary that, according to the thick view, communion comprises both shared beliefs and common virtues. It also involves common ministry, common worship and shared participation in the Church’s mission. This mission includes proclamation of the good news of reconciliation and redemption in Christ, teaching that forms faithful disciples, and care of those in need.
Now the question, once more, is what order is to protect, sustain, and further this thickly defined form of common life, and in what way, if at all, does it contain a form or forms of hierarchy? At this point we run directly into questions of hierarchy and church order. The covenant grants a central role to bishops “as guardians and teachers of the faith, as leaders in mission and as a visible sign of unity.” In this capacity, bishops represent “the universal Church to the local, and the local Church to the universal and the local Churches one to another.” They do this through a ministry that is “exercised personally, collegially, and within and for the Eucharistic community.”
The Covenant clearly envisions a form of hierarchical Episcopal order at a diocesan, even a provincial level, but not one that overarches the various provinces of the Communion. Beyond the boundaries of their diocese and/or province, the bishops exercise their function as guardians of the faith “not by central legislative and executive authority, but by mutual loyalty sustained through common counsel of the bishops in conference.”
The only form of inter-provincial hierarchy one can assume at this point is one of “moral authority” on the part of bishops in conference—a form of authority that places the burden of proof on one who dissents but relies upon voluntary compliance for effectiveness. This assumption has been present since the first Lambeth Conference. However, to the statement about mutual loyalty sustained through conferral among bishops the proposed covenant adds the mutual loyalty and common counsel of “other instruments of communion.” These are listed as the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lambeth Conference, the Anglican Consultative Council and the Primates Meeting. To promote unity, these instruments have a responsibility “to consult with, respond to, and support each other.”
Clearly, the covenant envisions a process wherein these instruments reach a common mind and once expressed, that common mind is to be given moral authority. The Instruments thus order by moral suasion and in this process depend upon the moral authority of a common mind located in the Episcopal office. The moral authority of Bishops in conference constitutes a hierarchy of sorts in that their counsel is due deference. However, Bishops in council have no political authority as a council beyond the borders of their own diocese or province. In these realms, they do not have authority to enforce their judgments.
Now another question presents itself. How is a thick view of communion to be maintained if the moral authority of the instruments is resisted or refused and there are no mechanisms of enforcement? The answer provided by the proposed covenant is a procedure that can issue in a judgment that either recognizes as fitting a matter some have questioned or concludes that the Communion is indeed faced with a novelty it cannot recognize as part of the common mind and practice that binds the Communion together.
V
The question now becomes does the procedure, as its critics assert, set up a central political authority that has jurisdiction over the various churches of the Communion. The answer to this question, despite many protestations to the contrary, is most emphatically no. As I understand it, the procedure works as follows, and though it involves various forms of hierarchy, none of them qualify as a centralized authority with jurisdiction over the various Provinces of the Communion.
When an issue arises concerning “the meaning of the Covenant, or about the compatibility of an action by a covenanting Church with the Covenant” each covenanting Church is committed under provision 3.2 of the Covenant to “have regard for the common good of the Communion in the exercise of its autonomy…to respect the constitutional autonomy of all the Churches of the Anglican Communion while upholding… mutual responsibility and interdependence…” of each Church to the other. Further the churches are to exercise patience and to spend time in seeking a common mind. They are as well “to act with diligence, care and caution in respect of any action which may provoke controversy, which by its intensity, substance or extent could threaten the unity of the Communion.” Finally, in these situations of conflict, the churches are to be willing to participate in mediated conversations.
These are commitments that, as it were, bracket any conflict brought on by an action or interpretation of the meaning of the Covenant that raise the issue of recognition. It is the duty of The Standing Committee of the Anglican Communion responsible to the Meeting of Primates and the ACC (but, as I understand it a part of neither) to monitor these proceedings. If a shared mind has not been reached through the above process, the matter in question is to be referred to The Standing Committee. (Let us call this process one.) The Standing Committee is then to make every effort to facilitate agreement. The Standing Committee, may, during the course of these discussions, “request a Church to defer a controversial action.” If the Church in question declines to do so, The Standing Committee “may recommend to any Instrument of Communion relational consequences.” These may include provisional limitation or suspension of participation in that Instrument until the completion of a succeeding process.
What process then ensues? (Let us call this process two.) If it receives advice from the ACC and the Meeting of Primates to do so, The Standing Committee may declare that an action or decision is or would be “incompatible with the covenant.” Further, on the basis of the advice received from the Instruments in question, The Standing Committee “shall make recommendations as to relational consequences that flow from an action incompatible with the covenant.” These recommendations, it is important to note, may be addressed to the churches of the Anglican Communion or to the Instruments of Communion, and they may address the extent of impaired communion and the practical consequences of that impairment. Further, it is important to note, “Each Church or each Instrument shall determine whether or not to accept such recommendations.”
I hope all this is clear. The two processes set out in Section Four of the proposed covenant involve much “toing and froing” between The Standing Committee, the Instruments and the Churches of the Communion. However, it is simply not the case that the Covenant sets up The Standing Committee as a sort of “court of star chamber” that has central judicial and jurisdictional authority. The Standing Committee, in cases involving “recognition”, monitors, receives advice, discerns and recommends either to the churches of the Communion or its Instruments or both. These entities are free in each case either to accept the recommendations or not.
The proposed covenant does not set up a central judiciary or a central form of jurisdiction. It does, however, involve various forms of hierarchy. There is first of all an administrative form of hierarchy located in the Instruments and The Standing Committee. It is intended to facilitate discernment on the part of the Communion and its Instruments in cases where there is a problem of recognition either of an action or an interpretation of the Covenant. There is second a hierarchy of discernment in respect to disputed matters that is located once more in The Standing Committee and the Instruments. There is third a moral hierarchy also located in The Standing Committee and the Instruments. Presumably, the recommendations of these bodies, to the extent they are in agreement, place the burden of proof on those churches that may disagree. Finally, there is a limited form of political authority. That is, The Standing Committee and the Instruments may limit or suspend participation on the part of a Church that refuses their counsel. This form of political authority has been accorded to the Archbishop of Canterbury since the first Lambeth Conference when he withheld an invitation to Bishop Colenso. It was recently exercised in the case of the Bishop of New Hampshire. The political authority of the Archbishop of Canterbury to invite (or not) is, in the proposed covenant, simply being extended in a limited way to the other Instruments of Communion. Here one is not dealing with a jurisdictional authority, but with a procedure for determining membership and its privileges.
Allow me a final comment before passing on to the “thin” view of communion. It is clear to me that the proposed covenant is indeed designed to sustain and strengthen a form of communion that involves common belief and practice as well as common mission, and common ministry coupled with mutual hospitality and assistance. It seems clear to me also that it does so in a way that protects the autonomy of the various provinces of the Communion. It is clear to me as well, however, that the success of the covenant in achieving the goal of autonomy in communion, since it does not have a central form of jurisdiction, depends upon the presence and exercise of certain graces within and between the various Churches. These are sketched in #3 of the Introduction—“Faithfulness, honesty, gentleness, humility, forgiveness, and love itself, lived out in mutual deference and service.” To these we might add, as did the Virginia Report, mutual subjection in the body of Christ that manifests itself in “eagerness to maintain the bond of peace in the unity of the Spirit.” This understanding of what might be called the moral and spiritual foundation of the proposed covenant mirrors that of Paul in the letter to the Romans (12-16) and in the Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians. The quality of life in the Spirit among Anglicans will determine the fate of their communion. The structures and procedures proposed by the drafters of the Covenant can facilitate communion but they will not be effective apart from the form of life summarized by the graces listed in the “Introduction.”
In one way, I believe the present Archbishop of Canterbury understands this truth about a conciliar form of governance. Many have criticized him (myself included) for silence during the processes that have led up to the present covenant proposal. However, to be fair, one must recognize that conciliar governance, which eschews centralized forms of authority and power, depends upon a commitment to forms of mutual subjection like those that undergird the present covenant proposal. This simple fact limits what any Archbishop of Canterbury can achieve. Apart from a willingness to be subject one to another all the moral authority in the world will be of little effect.
The drafters of the proposed covenant appear to be aware that it is the presupposition of mutual subjection that provides the foundation for Anglican polity in all it forms. Sadly, it is precisely this understanding that TEC’s present leadership seems to lack. The recent history of that church has been one of contending parties relentlessly pressing their position with the sole purpose of winning. It is not surprising that TEC has carried the same strategy into inter-Anglican relations by acting on its convictions even in the face of objections on the part of each of the Instruments of Communion and a significant majority of the churches that comprise the Communion. TEC’s stance is particularly sad because it is just this form of conciliarism that Anglicans have to offer to our primary ecumenical partners, and it is just this form of conciliarism that TEC’s actions have served to subvert.
VI
The form of church order sketched above is intended to sustain and further a “thick” theological account of communion. That championed by those who hold a “thin” account has a very different goal, and favors a far less structured form of inter-provincial relationship—one in which none of the forms of hierarchy present in the covenant proposal extend beyond diocesan and provincial boundaries. The goal is different because advocates of the thin position have a very different theology and give a very different account of the Communion and its order.
The earliest expression of that view of which I am aware comes from the former Archbishop of Canada, Michael Peers, in his Arnold Lecture of 2000. Archbishop Peers juxtaposes a form of communion based upon confessional agreement with one rooted in the practice of mutual hospitality and aid. In his view, the boundaries of autonomous dioceses and provinces should not be drawn by confessional statements (which he considers an Un-Anglican Activity). It is his view that the Provinces are tied together by appreciation of difference and mutual aid rather than identity of belief and practice.
By using confessionalism as a foil for his relational view of communion, Archbishop Peers sets up something of a straw man. Mark Chapman, in his article “Catholicity, Unity and Provincial Autonomy” provides a far more convincing version of the thin account. He agrees that there must be fundamentals, but for Anglicans these are adequately expressed by the four elements of the Chicago/Lambeth Quadrilateral. These boundaries do not provide much by way of theological specificity; however, for two reasons, what might be called “theological under-definition” is thought to be a good thing. First, because of differences in cultural and historical context Christian truth, for the sake of effectiveness, must receive various articulations. Second, Christian truth can only be partially grasped within history. A fully adequate grasp of that truth lies out ahead. It is an eschatological goal rather than a present possession. For these reasons, Provinces ought to be given maximal autonomy. Relations between them should not be on the basis of doctrinal recognition but on the basis of love. Doctrinal agreement is a consummation devoutly to be hoped for but not a present requirement for communion.
Ian Douglas, who also favors a form of theological polycentrism, takes the argument a little further by suggesting that what he considers moves toward the centralization of authority in the Anglican Communion are not only destructive of the richness of Christian expression but also expressions of paternalism on the part of Western Christians who wish to retain control of an increasingly diverse communion. He acknowledges the need for transnational structures, but sees them in the service of common mission rather than as means of insuring the provinces recognize a commonality in their belief and practice
These two authors present the two pillars of the thin position, viz., the inevitability and benefit of doctrinal pluralism on the one hand and a view of communion whose foundation is common mission (understood primarily as seeking peace and justice) abetted by mutual aid and hospitality on the other. There are, however, more polemical defenses of the thin position in circulation. I have mentioned Ian Douglas’ charge that the Windsor Report gives expression to a form of Western paternalism. Bloggers have leveled the even more serious charge that the covenant is the tool of homophobic forces bent on causing conflict and furthering injustice in all parts of the globe. Behind these negative judgments, however, stands a positive theological conviction—one that provides what I believe to be the primary justification for the thin view of communion. The conviction is that the action of TEC constitutes a prophetic witness, and that prophetic witness in defense of gay people and other marginalized persons is a primary vocation of TEC. Prophecy is, in fact, the particular gift TEC has to offer the Communion and its ecumenical partners.
Behind TEC’s fascination with the prophetic office stands a distinctive construal of the Gospel of Christ, namely, that God’s purpose in history is to establish peace and justice and include the outcast and disadvantaged within its compass. The mission of the church, like that of Christ, is to seek justice apart from which there can be no peace. Communion between the churches is one of placing themselves jointly in God’s service in a quest for peace and justice. In this case, church order is properly designed to facilitate cooperation and mutual assistance in this effort but not common belief and practice.
VII
It is not surprising that this difference in theological perspective has had its effects both upon TEC’s relation with the rest of the communion and upon the way in which its own order is interpreted. In respect to TEC’s relations with the rest of the communion, I have said enough already to make a credible claim that resistance within TEC to Section 4 of the proposed covenant is related to a theological conviction that the Gospel message must be incarnated in given places. In North America, TEC’s leadership claims such incarnation requires full inclusion of gay people in the life of the Church. Covenantal provisions that impede such contextualization are, therefore, to be resisted.
In respect to the way in which advocates of the thin view interpret TEC’s own Constitution and Canons a tack opposite to that taken in respect to the Communion as a whole has been followed. Since full inclusion is central to the Gospel message, dissent in respect to such a view is to be strongly resisted. To oppose inclusion is a matter of injustice. One must, therefore, have a strong central authority to prevent deviations of this sort. The problem is that TEC’s Constitution does not give either The General Convention, or the Office of the Presiding Bishop, or the Executive Council, or the Council of Advice this sort of authority. As a result, it is difficult to place limits on dissent by individual dioceses. Unfortunately, within TEC, dissent of this sort has to date taken the form of leaving TEC for another province—sometimes by individual parishes and sometimes by entire dioceses.
My own view is that this form of dissent lacks both adequate theological justification and prudential merit. Be that as it may, TEC’s constitution makes no provision for addressing the action of dissenting dioceses by the ordering mechanisms just mentioned. Given the centrality of the issue involved and given the value of the property involved, it is not surprising that The Office of the Presiding Bishop has proposed a novel view of the ordering mechanisms of TEC—one that presents TEC not (as stipulated by its present constitution) as a voluntary association of dioceses that creates mechanisms to facilitate a common mission but as a corporation to which the various dioceses are subservient.
Before bringing this discussion to a close, I must comment on what I take to be the inadequacy of the “thin position.” One must welcome the fact that, as in the case of those who support the thick account, advocates of the thin position have at last turned their attention to questions of order and hierarchy. In doing so, however, those who hold the thin position have exposed the inadequacy and incoherence of their own view.
How so? It has been noted that the form of jurisdictional and moral hierarchy they dismiss or condemn on an international level they elevate on a local one. It is precisely at this point, however, that the inadequacy and incoherence of the thin position becomes patently obvious. In respect to inadequacy, one is forced to say that the account of mission so central to the thin position is itself “thin.” It focuses relentlessly on good works in pursuit of peace and justice yet pays little or no attention to the transcendence of God, the atoning sacrifice of Christ or the importance of conversion. It is also the case that the sort of theological diversity advocated in the end empties the notion of Christian identity of meaningful content. Indeed, it empties the notion of communion itself of meaningful content. Simple citation of the four elements of the Chicago/Lambeth Quadrilateral leaves room for all sorts of false accounts of Christian belief and practice and so does little to address the question of “recognizability.” In the end one is left with little more than a loose association of churches linked by a rapidly fading common history and mutually beneficial aid agreements.
In respect to incoherence, let this problem be noted. Because those who hold the thin view of communion believe that the inclusion of gay people is a matter of the Gospel, a question immediately presents itself. What would be their position if a majority of the provinces of the Communion shared their view? Would they continue to support the sort of pluralism they now do? Because they believe the inclusion they advocate is a matter of the Gospel, it would seem that they would at least, on this issue, insist upon “recognition” of their position throughout the communion. One must ask, therefore, if in fact the thin version of communion is not merely a tactical stance fashioned to create space for a progressive view of the substance of the Gospel until such time as it is more generally accepted. One must ask as well if in fact a pluralistic view of communion of the sort progressive voices advocate does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that space must be made for false accounts of the Christian Gospel including ones that advocate forms of injustice. In short, one must ask if a thin view of communion like that now advocated by TEC does not necessarily end in a rather obvious self-contradiction.
VIII
Be that as it may, TEC pleads for a right of dissent on a communion level but, by constitutional irregularity and canonical misuse, seeks to close out that possibility within its own ranks. With this point, I rest my case. A failure to pay attention to that wretched cat “Polity” has landed TEC and the Anglican Communion in a proper mess. Anglicans now have before them two accounts of the nature of communion, two accounts of hierarchy, and two accounts of the way in which the common life of the Communion ought to be ordered. For the thick account, hierarchy is of different sorts, each of which has a particular sphere of operation and each of which stands in the service of a thick view of communion. For the thin account, hierarchy is addressed only in its political guise and as such is limited in its sphere of operation to diocese and/or province. Within these spheres, it serves to order local and autonomous churches each of which is called to carry out the mission of the church in a particular locality.
I personally am delighted that both TEC and the Communion are at last paying attention to the wretched cat “Polity.” In doing so, however, the issue of dissent has presented itself with considerable urgency. At the moment, TEC finds itself in a dissenting position in respect to the covenant proposal now before the Communion; while those within TEC who support the covenant find themselves dissenters in relation to their own church. It would seem that everyone within TEC is in one way or another confronted with the issue of dissent.
When the normal processes of governance no longer provide effective means for objection, just what is the right way to express this dissent? For those within TEC, is the right way departure? For TEC itself, is the right way to seek, as now it does, to escape the consequences of its actions by means of a covenant that lacks both theological substance and any meaningful form of accountability? My own view is that the answer to this question is to be found in the well-tested tradition of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience seeks neither to bring down duly constituted authority nor to establish another altogether. Rather it seeks to express loyalty to governing authority by dissenting from actions that do not accord with the reasons for its existence. Further, in dissenting those who are civilly disobedient insist upon suffering the appointed penalties for disobedience. They insist upon consequences so as to express loyalty to duly constituted authority even as they oppose actions that do not accord with the common good that government exists to uphold and further.
So, in conclusion, I suggest that we all attend to the counsel of our despised cat “Polity,” recognize the creature as an unlikely but valuable friend, give our support to the proposed covenant, and, if necessary, learn the practice of “ecclesial disobedience” as an expression of both dissent and loyalty. We learn this ancient art not as a means of breaking or weakening our communion one with another, but as a means, through costly witness, of strengthening our communion in one Lord, one faith and one baptism and one Father of us all.
February 07 2010 05:03 pm
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